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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the impact of preferential regulatory treatment on
banks’ demand for government bonds. Using unique transaction-level data, our analysis
suggests that preferential treatment in microprudential liquidity and capital regulation
significantly increases banks’ demand for government bonds. Liquidity and capital reg-
ulation also seem to incentivize banks to substitute other bonds with government bonds.
We also find evidence that this "regulatory effect" leads banks to reduce lending to the
real economy.
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1. Introduction
European banks hold sizeable shares of government debt securities.1 Popov and van
Horen (2013) argue that the 0% risk weight in the context of capital regulation is a key
driver of banks’ holdings of government bonds. Besides capital regulation, government
debt securities also receive preferential treatment in the newly proposed Basel III liquid-
ity requirements as well as in the context of regulatory efforts to limit large exposures to
individual countries and counterparts.2 While they also bring forward the argument of
preferential regulatory treatment, Gennaioli et al. (2013) formulate two more hypotheses
explaining banks’ holdings of government bonds. The first one follows a large stream of
literature arguing that banks hold government bonds as source of liquidity and collateral
making them operating more effectively during normal times but not necessarily during
stress.3 The second hypothesis follows Acharya and Steffen (2013) and is based on the
idea that banks hold lower quality government bonds, allowing them to gain from pref-
erential regulatory treatment but at the same time secure high returns. A further reason
was brought forward by Farhi and Tirole (2014), who argue that banks hold domestic
government bonds to increase the likelihood of public support.
The focus of this paper is the first argument, and specifically the question whether
financial regulation increases banks’ demand for government bonds (henceforth "regu-
latory effect") or rather whether banks’ government bond holdings are driven by other
factors (henceforth "internal effect"), such as the ones brought forward by Holmstroem
and Tirole (1993), Acharya and Steffen (2013) and Farhi and Tirole (2014).4
Especially the European sovereign debt crisis raised concerns regarding the vicious
1 See, for instance, EBA (2013a).
2 See BCBS (2010a,b, 2013) as well as EU No 575/2013 ("CRD IV").
3 See, for instance, Gennaioli et al. (2014) or Holmstroem and Tirole (1993).
4 It is likely that several of these factors jointly play a role in banks’ decision-making processes.
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circle between weak bank balance sheets and sovereign fragility.5 A possible way to
break this vicious circle is to reduce the attractiveness of government bonds in financial
regulation.6 In line with this, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision stated in
a recent report to the G20 leaders that it will review the current regulatory treatment
of sovereign risk and consider possible policy options.7 To arrive at sound solutions,
however, we first need to understand whether financial regulation is truly a key driver of
banks’ government bond holdings.8
The correlation between banks’ funding and liquidity needs (or other incentives) and
their compliance with regulatory requirements poses a challenge to establishing a causal
link from the various incentives for banks to hold government bonds and their actual
holdings. To distinguish whether a change in banks’ government bond holdings is caused
by regulation or by other factors, we need detailed information on banks’ targets used in
their internal risk management frameworks.
Since such data is not available in a structural form, an alternative approach is to dis-
tinguish whether the proximity of a bank to its regulatory liquidity and capital thresholds
changes its demand for government bonds during the entire following month or only
around the monthly reporting date. The hypothesis is that if banks’ regulatory capital
and liquidity positions change their demand for government bonds over the entire next
month, it cannot be established whether this is caused by internal or regulatory effects.
However, a change in demand only around the reporting date points towards the presence
of a regulatory effect.
5 See, for instance, Brutti and Saure (2013), Acharya and Steffen (2013), Gennaioli et al. (2014) or Farhi
and Tirole (2014).
6 Alternatively, one could also require banks to significantly increase their capital and liquidity levels.
7 See BCBS (2015).
8 The main criticism of the current regulatory treatment of government bonds is that government bonds of
an institution’s home jurisdiction get the most favorable treatment across most regulatory frameworks,
independent of their riskiness. See also Weidmann (2013) and Buch et al. (2013).
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Using unique transaction-level data obtained from the Markets in Financial Instru-
ments Directive (MiFID) database for 17 banks from June 2009 to December 2012, this
paper attempts to distinguish regulatory from internal effects and aims to answer the ques-
tion whether microprudential capital and liquidity regulation increases banks’ demand for
government bonds beyond their own risk appetite, leading banks to substitute other types
of bonds with government bonds.
Due to the presence of long-running liquidity and capital requirements in the Nether-
lands, it is possible to assess the impact of both requirements, allowing to draw the link
to Basel III. The Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) suggest that liquidity and cap-
ital requirements cause banks’ demand for government bonds to increase beyond their
internal risk management targets. The relative preferential treatment seems to cause a
substitution effect, with banks buying government bonds while selling other bonds. We
also find suggestive evidence that this regulatory effect reduces banks’ lending to the real
economy.
When drawing policy implications from these results, it is important to note that the
purpose of this paper is to analyze whether financial regulation increases banks’ demand
for government bonds and whether this effect has an adverse impact on the real economy.
While the paper provides new insights into these dynamics, it does not comprehensively
answer the question whether increased government bond holdings are desirable. How-
ever, the analysis confirms that, if policymakers wish to break the vicious circle between
weak governments and weak banks, changing financial regulation appears to be a good
starting point.
2. Background
This section provides general background regarding the hypothesis as well as the key
variables underlying our analysis. Section 2.1 provides information on data sources and
4
variable construction. Most importantly, the section discusses the MiFID dataset and in-
troduces the dependent variable of the main regression analysis in this paper. The variable
describes banks’ net purchases of government bonds and other bonds over the course of
the month.
Although the focus of this paper is banks’ demand for government bonds, Section 2.2
discusses the evolution of banks’ government bond holdings from 2004 to 2012. Section
2.3 explains the regulatory treatment of government bonds in microprudential liquidity
and capital regulation and introduces the key explanatory variables of our econometric
analysis. It also discusses the development of banks’ liquidity buffers and capital levels
in recent years and how binding the requirements were during the period from June 2009
to December 2012. Section 2.3 also shows that both, capital and liquidity requirements,
are binding from time to time for the majority of institutions.
Section 2.4 presents some descriptive statistics regarding banks’ government bond pur-
chases. The data suggests that, on aggregate, banks’ net purchases of government bonds
are relatively stable during the course of the month. Section 2.4 does not yet discuss the
impact of banks’ regulatory capital and liquidity positions on their net purchases, which
is the purpose of the subsequent regression analysis. Section 2.5 provides summary stat-
istics.
2.1. Data Sources
To analyze the impact of regulatory treatment in microprudential liquidity and capital
regulation on banks’ demand for government bonds, this paper brings together data on 1)
bilateral transactions of Dutch bonds between Dutch banks; 2) banks’ regulatory liquidity
and capital positions; 3) risk indicators and other measures calculated from the balance
sheet, as well as 4) macroeconomic factors.
The primary data source of this paper are the MiFID transaction reports obtained from
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the Netherlands Authority for the Financial Markets (AFM). The MiFID was introduced
as part of the EU financial market integration in November 2007 with the purpose to reg-
ulate the provision of financial instruments and to clarify the responsibilities and powers
of national competent authorities regarding these activities.9 Articles 25(3) and (4) of Mi-
FID require financial institutions to report trading activities for any instrument admitted
to trading on regulated venues. As such, the MiFID database is the most comprehensive
dataset on bond transactions in the EU.10
The MiFID database covers June 2009 to December 2012. Along with a large amount
of other information, each transaction includes the International Securities Identification
Number (ISIN) of the traded security, the two counterparts, volume, time to maturity,
the exact time as well as whether the reporting institution acted as a buyer or a seller.
After cleaning and consolidating the data, we use the transaction reports to construct
the total daily purchases and sales per consolidated entity, distinguishing government
bonds from all other bonds.11 The dependent variable of our regression analysis, banks’
daily net purchases of government bonds and other bonds, is calculated as the difference
between institution i’s gross purchases and gross sales of bond b (government bonds or
other bonds) as a percentage of its average daily gross purchases during the year. Govern-
ment bonds only include Dutch government bonds, while other bonds include all bonds
issued by Dutch entities other than the Dutch government. Other bonds therefore include
all covered bonds, corporate bonds as well as securitizations issued by Dutch institutions.
It does not include government bonds issued by other countries than the Netherlands or
other non-Dutch institutions.12
9 Directive 2004/39/EC.
10 See EBA (2013b), which provides evidence for the comprehensive coverage of the database. Note
though that we only have data on transactions of securities issued by Dutch (financial) institutions.
11 For more information on data cleaning, please see the Appendix.
12 Please note that we do not have data on securities issued by non-Dutch institutions.
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The regulatory liquidity data stems from banks’ monthly reporting of the Dutch li-
quidity requirement (DLCR). Since the DLCR applies to all banks, clearing as well as
settlement institutions, and only a few waivers apply to foreign branches, all banks in
our sample are subject to the requirement. For the purpose of this analysis, we calcu-
late the distance of banks’ DLCR to the regulatory threshold. The capital ratio is taken
from banks’ reporting in the context of Basel 2.5 (quarterly) in combination with monthly
monitoring reports.13
Since it plays an important role in the context of adjusting to regulation and the de-
cision to hold government bonds, we additionally obtained data on banks’ net income as
a percentage of total assets and banks’ return on equity (net income as a percentage of
total capital). Another bank-specific variable is banks’ lending to households and non-
financial corporations as a percentage of total assets. The bank-specific data is taken from
DNB’s prudential reporting. Our bank-specific variables also include the growth rate of
the DLCR’s denominator, which is intended to capture the evolution of banks’ liabilities,
as well as an institution’s fulfilment of the average reserve requirement. All bank-specific
variables are reported monthly.
As macroeconomic variables, the analysis includes the EONIA interest rate, the quarterly
GDP growth rate of the Netherlands, total government debt over total GDP of the Neth-
erlands, as well as the relative rating of the Netherlands compared to its peers (Germany,
Finland, France, Austria and Belgium).14 With the exception of the relative rating, which
13 According to law, the microprudential liquidity requirement entails a monthly reporting requirement,
while the capital requirement has to be reported only quarterly. However, in the additional supervisory
rules, it is specified that both requirements have to be fulfilled on an on-going basis and have to be
monitored (and reported) at least monthly. For both requirements, the reference date is the last day of
each month, while the reporting date is a few days after that.
14 To calculate the relative rating, all country-specific ratings are converted to numeric values (AAA=1).
The Netherlands’ rating is then divided by the average rating of its peers. In case a country is put on
"negative watch", the rating is reduced by 0.5.
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comes directly from the S&P database, all macroeconomic variables are retrieved from
the ECB’s statistical data warehouse.
2.2. Government bond holdings from 2004 to 2012
Although the paper focuses on banks’ purchases and sales of government bonds, it is
useful to first have a look at how banks’ holdings of government bonds have evolved in
recent years. Figure 1 shows the evolution of banks’ government bond holdings from
2004 to 2012. The vertical lines represent the start (June 2009) and end date (December
2012) of the MiFID dataset.
[Insert Figure 1 here]
The DLCR and includes all government bonds with a 0% risk weight under the Basel II
Standardized Approach. On average, Dutch government bonds comprise around 40% of
banks’ total government bond holdings, closely followed by German government bonds.
Many Dutch banks also hold some Belgian, French and very small amounts of Southern
European bonds.15
As can be seen from Figure 1a, in 2004 banks’ average holdings of high quality govern-
ment bonds amounted to about 12%, while median holdings were just above 8%. Apart
from some smaller spikes, banks’ government bond holdings declined relatively steadily
until the outbreak of the financial crisis in September 2008. As typical during financial
crises, government bonds rose between September 2008 and September 2009 from just
above 8% to almost 12.5%. In October 2009, Greece announced that it had significantly
underreported its budget deficit. After this announcement, which is often seen as the be-
15 For more information on European bond holdings, please see the European Central Bank’s statistical
report on "Debt securities issuance and servicing by EU governments".
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ginning of the European sovereign debt crisis, banks seem to significantly reduce their
exposure to governments. While average holdings stabilized in the course of 2011, me-
dian holdings show another sharp reduction, suggesting that there are a number of banks
that seem to have maintained larger amounts.
As presented in Figure 1b, government bond holdings in liquid assets show a similar
pattern, meaning a rather steady decline until the financial crisis, followed by a sharp
increase, which is reversed in response to the sovereign debt crisis. The sharp increase
of government bond holdings in liquid assets in May 2011 is due to a revision of the
liquidity rule, which increased the haircuts of all securities. However, the haircuts of
government bonds were only increased by 5%, while most other assets were subject to
haircut increases of about 30%. The revision made the rule stricter but increased the
relative attractiveness of government bonds.
2.3. Government bonds in regulatory frameworks
While national capital requirements date back even further, the implementation of Basel I
in 1992 harmonized capital regulation across the globe. Since then, both the definition of
eligible capital and the risk weights (RW) of an institution’s assets have been subject to
several changes. The most recent development is the Basel III accord and its implement-
ation in national legislation.16
To understand the interaction of capital requirements and government bond holdings,
it is useful to begin with a closer look at the calculation of regulatory capital ratios:
Capital requirement =
Total capital
Risk weighted assets (RWA)
≥ 8% (1)
16 See BCBS (2010b) and EU No 575/2013 ("CRD IV").
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Since our dataset covers June 2009 to December 2012, the Basel 2.5 definition of capital
is applicable. Total capital therefore consists to at least 50% of Tier 1 capital (equity cap-
ital and disclosed reserves) complemented by undisclosed reserves, revaluation reserves,
general provisions and loan-loss reserves, hybrid debt capital instruments, as well as some
subordinated debt (Tier 2). Capital requirements are reported quarterly while monitoring
takes place on a monthly basis.
As can be seen, the denominator of the capital requirement is determined by mul-
tiplying the notional amounts of an institution’s assets by their respective RW. Thus, if an
institution holds an asset with a 20% RW, it needs to hold capital amounting to at least 8%
(the minimum capital ratio) of the notional amount of the respective asset multiplied by
20%. Due to their 0% RW, foreign government bonds rated AAA to AA- or any domestic
government bond do not require banks to hold any capital, making government bonds
relatively more attractive.17 To increase its capital ratio, a bank can therefore either raise
capital or reduce its RWA. While banks are able to raise capital in the short run, adjust-
ment costs usually make them hesitant to do so.18 To reduce their RWA, banks can either
reduce lending or sell securities. However, since the majority of banks’ loans have long
maturities, compressing the loan portfolio is often difficult. As institutions need sufficient
securities for funding purposes, only selling large amounts of securities with high RW is
not realistic either. As such, the seemingly easiest way to address a short-term capital
shortcoming is to substitute bonds with high RW by government bonds.
17 Usually government bonds have lower yields than other securities. Under normal circumstances insti-
tutions balance the gains from holding government bonds (safe asset, preferential regulatory treatment)
with the opportunity costs of doing so (lower return). During the sovereign debt crisis, bonds issued
by European peripheral countries had very high yields while banks could still gain from preferential
regulatory treatment.
18 It is sometimes argued that more capital reduces banks’ return on equity, which in turn determines the
dividends their shareholders receive. Existing shareholders are therefore said to have an incentive to
avoid capital increases. However, according to Admati et al. (2014) these arguments are flawed because
raising more equity makes the bank less risky and therefore reduces its funding costs.
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Turning to liquidity regulation, we can see similar dynamics. As proxy for the Basel III
Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) we use the Dutch liquidity requirement (DLCR), which
was introduced in July 2003 and revised in May 2011.19 The LCR and the DLCR are very
similar in their design and are both based on classic liquidity "coverage" considerations.
Both ratios are reported monthly and require banks to hold an amount of high quality




Required Liquidity within 30 days
≥ 100% (2)
Actual Liquidity (AL) is calculated as the sum of liquid assets minus haircuts plus con-
tractual cash inflows weighted by degree of liquidity. AL includes cash, government
bonds as well as central bank eligible covered bonds, corporate bonds and securitizations.
The DLCR is reported monthly. Required Liquidity (RL) is a combination of assumed
calls on off-balance sheet items (e.g. committed credit facilities) and withdrawals of de-
posits.
Compared to the LCR, the DLCR has a wider definition of liquid assets but applies
higher haircuts. For instance, the DLCR has a wider definition of eligible securitizations.
However, all securitizations are subject to a haircut of 50%, as opposed to the 25% haircut
applied in the LCR. The DLCR is somewhat stricter regarding the outflow assumptions
of banks’ liabilities. Retail deposits, for instance, receive outflow rates between 10% and
20% in the DLCR, but between 3% and 10% in the LCR. On aggregate, the differences
between the LCR and the DLCR are insignificant. In this sample, 92% of the observa-
19 For legal background on the DLCR, please refer to DNB (2003). For two recent papers, please refer to
Bonner and Eijffinger (2015) or De Haan and van den End (2013).
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tions show joint (non-)compliance with the LCR and DLCR. The correlation coefficient
is 86%.20
An important difference between the two ratios is the treatment of government bonds,
especially in light of the DLCR’s revision in May 2011. Before May 2011, government
bonds were subject to a haircut of 5%, compared to 20% of most other bonds. The revi-
sion in May 2011 increased the haircuts of government bonds to 10% while the haircuts
of most other bonds increased to 50%.21 Apart from covered bonds, which retained their
haircut of 20%, all bonds issued by corporates or banks were subject to haircut increases
to 50%.22 The revision in May 2011 made government bonds therefore relatively more at-
tractive from a regulatory point of view. This difference between the LCR and the DLCR
implies that the potential impact is even bigger for the LCR.
Similar to capital, an institution can steer its DLCR by either increasing its AL or by
reducing its RL. Again, however, reducing liabilities seems to be a less feasible option
than increasing liquid assets. Buying government bonds appears to be the most efficient
strategy to correct a DLCR deficiency.
[Insert Figure 2 here]
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the components of both the DLCR and the capital re-
quirement. Figure 2a shows that banks’ available and required liquidity are quite closely
correlated. According to recent evidence by Banerjee and Hio (2014), banks mainly ad-
20 See the Appendix for a table comparing the two standards.
21 For more details, see http://www.toezicht.dnb.nl/en/2/51-201890.jsp and
http://www.toezicht.dnb.nl/en/2/51- 201842.jsp.
22 Covered bonds have a very similar structure to securitizations and are most commonly backed by mort-
gages. In contrast to securitizations (which are moved to a Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV)), covered
bonds remain on the issuer’s balance sheet. For more information, see EBA (2013b).
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just their asset side in response to liquidity regulation. Banks’ liquidity buffers steadily
increased from 2004 until the beginning of the financial crisis in 2008, when buffers began
to decline. A particularly sharp decline can be observed immediately after the failure of
Lehman Brothers in October 2008. The sharpest spike can be observed after the revision
of the liquidity rule in May 2011, when available liquidity sharply declined.
Turning to Figure 2b, we can observe relatively high correlation between capital and
RWA before 2008, when capital continued to increase, while RWA declined. The decline
of RWA is likely caused by banks having to write off significant shares of their loans.
Since we are interested in the impact of capital and liquidity regulation on banks’ de-
mand for government bonds, it is important to understand how binding the requirements
are. Figure 3 shows the distribution of the DLCR and capital requirement per bank over
the period from June 2009 to December 2012.
[Insert Figure 3 here]
Figure 3a shows that the DLCRs of most banks range between 100% and 200%. Most
of these banks have several observations close to the regulatory threshold of 100%, some
even below that. Figure 3b points towards a similar pattern, showing that the capital ratios
of most banks lie between 10% and 20%.
Berger et al. (2008) show that banks tend to maintain a (precautionary) capital buf-
fer above the regulatory threshold to avoid supervisory penalties.23 On top of that, most
23 Non-compliance with the requirements in our sample will cause immediate action by the supervisor.
Should a bank breach the liquidity or capital requirement, the bank must immediately increase its re-
porting frequency, explain the reasons for non-compliance and is required to communicate a plan on
how it intends to become compliant again. If the bank fails to adhere to the agreed plan, it will have
to pay a fine that is calculated as a function of current interest rates and the detected shortfall. It is
sometimes argued that non-compliance leads to an immediate implicit fine (e.g. the costs for increasing
the reporting frequency, formulating a plan, etc.) and possibly an explicit fine.
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banks in the Netherlands are subject to additional Pillar 2 capital and liquidity require-
ments. Against this background, it is likely that even holdings above the regulatory min-
imum are binding.
There are, however, three banks in the sample with DLCRs that are constantly above
200% and one bank with the majority of observations above 200%. Since the DLCR is
not binding for these banks (even taking into account precautionary and Pillar 2 buffers),
there is the chance that they act differently. Similarly, there are two banks with capital
ratios that are constantly above 20% and one with the majority of observations above
20%. To avoid biases in this regard, the regression analysis includes two dummies. The
first dummy is 1 in case the DLCR is above 200% and 0 otherwise; the second dummy is
1 in case the capital ratio is above 20% and 0 otherwise.
2.4. Banks’ net purchases
Since the purpose of this paper is to distinguish regulatory from internal effects, it is im-
portant to understand banks’ trading patterns throughout a month. Figure 4 shows banks’
average net purchases of government bonds (Figure 4a) and other bonds (Figure 4b) over
windows consisting of 10 days, as well as the corresponding number of observations.
Banks’ net purchases are calculated as the difference between institution i’s gross pur-
chases and gross sales of bond b (government bond or other bonds) as a percentage of its
average daily gross purchases during the year.24 The number of observations corresponds
with the total number of trades executed by banks that are active as a buyer or a seller at
least once every day. Day 12, for instance, refers to banks’ average net purchases between
day 3 and day 12.
24 The idea behind calculating the variable that way is that it allows us to detect extraordinary portfolio
adjustments and that we tried to avoid scaling the dependent variable with a variable from a different
dataset (due to different levels of consolidation). Also see Section 6.
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Figure 4a shows that banks’ net purchases of government bonds are fairly stable and
only show a slight downward slope towards the end of the month. The average over the
entire month is 23%, with 20% and 24% being the minimum and the maximum, respect-
ively. A similar pattern can be observed for the number of observations. An important
takeaway from Figure 4a is that on aggregate banks do not seem to increase but rather
decrease their demand for government bonds towards the reporting date.
[Insert Figure 4 here]
Figure 4b shows that, similar to government bonds, banks’ net purchases of other
bonds are stable during the course of the month. The average over the entire sample
is 8%, with the maximum and minimum being 6% and 10%, respectively. In contrast
to government bonds, banks’ net purchases of other bonds somewhat increase towards
the end of the month. The data does not suggest the presence of a general regulatory
effect with all banks buying more government bonds while selling more other bonds
immediately before reporting.
2.5. Summary statistics
The analysis in this paper includes 17 Dutch banks. The constructed variables based on
the MiFID transaction reports represent daily observations per bank. Apart from the daily
fulfilment of the average reserve requirement, all bank-specific variables are reported
monthly, while the macroeconomic variables (apart from EONIA and the relative rating
of the Netherlands) are reflected by quarterly observations. The dataset is a balanced
panel, implying that there is no bank with missing observations. The 17 banks comprise
more than 99% of total banking sector assets and more than 95% of total lending. Four
of the 17 banks use the internal-rating-based approach (IRB) to calculate risk weights for
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government exposures. However, the average risk weight of these banks for sovereign
bonds amounts to less than 3% and is therefore not significantly higher than the 0% of
the Standardized Approach.25 The average size (natural logarithm) of the banks in the
sample is 17.84. Banks’ net income is about 1.23% of total assets, while banks’ return on
equity amounts on average to 4.92% (monthly).
[Insert Table 1 here]
3. Methodology
3.1. The model
The baseline regression takes the following form:
Net Purchasesi,b,d = β0 +β1(Capital bu f f er)i,m−1
+β2(Liquidity bu f f er)i,m−1 +β3(Revision)m−1 +β4(Liquidity bu f f er ∗Revision)i,m−1
+β5Controls(i,b,d),m(−1)+ εi,m
(3)
where Net Purchasesi,b,d refers to the difference between institution i’s gross purchases
and gross sales of bond b (government bonds or other bonds) on day d as a percentage of
its average daily gross purchases during the year.
Capital bu f f eri,m−1 refers to the difference between an institution’s capital ratio in
month m-1 and the regulatory threshold of 8%. Similarly, Liquidity bu f f eri,m−1 de-
25 Please also note that, since regulators have to approve banks’ IRB models, it is likely that government
bonds receive a similar preferential treatment in this regard.
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scribes the distance of an institution’s actual liquidity position in month m-1 from its reg-
ulatory threshold of 100%. Defining the ratios that way ensures that the intercept reflects
the value of the regression function at the regulatory threshold.26 As explained earlier,
the DLCR was revised in May 2011, making government bonds relatively more attractive.
Revisionm−1 is a dummy, which is 1 after the revision and 0 otherwise. (Liquidity bu f f er∗
Revision)i,m−1 reflects the interaction term of the two variables.
As discussed in Section 2.3, purchasing more government bonds while selling other
types of bonds is a possible strategy for banks to address a regulatory liquidity or capital
shortage. Against this background, we expect negative coefficients for Liquidity bu f f eri,m−1
and Capital bu f f eri,m−1 regarding government bonds (implying that banks with higher
regulatory liquidity and capital levels purchase fewer government bonds on a net basis)
and positive coefficients for other bonds (pointing to banks with higher regulatory posi-
tions to purchase more other bonds on a net basis). In the presence of a regulatory effect,
we expect these coefficients to only be significant closer to reporting. Since the revision
of the liquidity rule made government bonds relatively more attractive, it is expected that
it reinforces the mentioned effect.
Controls(i,b),m(−1) includes a combination of macroeconomic, bond-specific (b) and
other bank-specific (i) variables in month m (for the macroeconomic and bond-specific
variables) or m-1 (for the other bank-specific variables) and day d (only for the reserve
requirement). The additional bank-specific control variables include an institution’s prof-
itability (net income as a percentage of total assets), return on equity (income as a per-
centage of total equity) and total private sector lending as a percentage of total assets.
As argued by Delechat et al. (2012), it is easier for more profitable banks to fund them-
selves. Those banks are therefore more likely to look for alternative, more profitable
26 See, for instance, Lee and Lemieux (2010).
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funding sources to correct a regulatory capital or liquidity deficiency.27 On top of that,
more profitable banks might show different characteristics regarding their risk manage-
ment frameworks, which additionally motivate its inclusion. The bank-specific control
variables also include the growth rate of institutions’ Required Liquidity (as defined by
the DLCR). Although we are focussing on banks’ adjustments on the asset side, it is im-
portant to also account for developments on the liability side. As explained in Section 2.3,
we also include dummies for banks having DLCRs above 200% or capital ratios above
20%. Finally, we control for an institution’s fulfilment of the average central bank reserve
requirement.
The macroeconomic control variables include the EONIA interest rate, the GDP growth
rate of the Netherlands, the government debt of the Netherlands as a percentage of GDP,
as well as the relative rating of the Netherlands compared to its peers (Germany, Fin-
land, France, Austria and Belgium). The EONIA interest rate proxies the costs of banks’
alternative funding sources. If other interest rates in the economy are high, banks are
more likely to buy more government bonds and vice versa.28 Since the analysis only
includes Dutch government bonds, the relative rating of the Netherlands compared to its
peers is likely to affect banks’ demand. Depending on the motivation for banks to buy a
specific bond, a relatively better rating might have a positive impact (i.e. if the bank is
very risk averse) or a negative impact on demand (i.e. if the bank chases high returns).
The GDP growth rate is likely to capture demand effects of bank lending, which, in turn,
might be funded with bond issuances or motivates banks to hold less government bonds to
avoid excessive balance sheet expansion. Finally, the yield on Dutch government bonds
represents the costs of government bonds. All regressions are performed with bank and
27 Also see, for instance, Gennaioli et al. (2014) or Acharya and Steffen (2013).
28 Also see Acharya and Steffen (2013) or Aspachs et al. (2005).
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quarter dummies. The error term εi,m is standard for SUR and therefore institution- and
period-specific but the same across different types of bonds.
3.2. General approach and endogeneity
The graphical analysis suggests that on aggregate banks do not increase their government
bond holdings towards the end of the month. However, since the purpose of this paper is to
understand the impact of microprudential liquidity and capital regulation, it is important
to distinguish banks according to their regulatory position. To analyze the impact of
regulation, this paper assesses on which days of the month a bank’s regulatory capital and
liquidity positions have a significant impact on its net purchases of government bonds and
other bonds.
The hypothesis is that if a low regulatory liquidity or capital position in month m-1
affects banks’ demand over the entire month m, it cannot be established whether this is
caused by a regulatory effect or an internal effect. If, however, a bank’s demand is only
affected during the last few days before reporting, there is a strong indication for the pres-
ence of a regulatory effect. The argument is that an internal decision (fully independent
of regulation) would constantly and immediately affect a bank’s behavior, and the exact
time of purchases or sales would mainly be determined by prices. Purchases immediately
before reporting by banks with low regulatory capital and liquidity levels, on the other
hand, would point to a regulatory effect.
To conduct this analysis, the regression function is looped over 10 day windows, ex-
cluding weekends.29 The decision to select windows of 10 days for the main regression
is based on responses of banks suggesting that they monitor their regulatory ratios more
29 Since microprudential liquidity and capital ratios are reported monthly, the ratios remain constant
throughout a month. Banks’ demand for government bonds and other bonds, however, is calculated
on a daily basis and then looped over 10 day windows.
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closely around 10 days before reporting.30 The model is estimated 20 times with the first
window spanning from day 1 to day 10 and the last window spanning from day 21 to day
30.31
Since this paper analyzes banks’ demand for government bonds compared to other
bonds, the application of Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR) seems the appropriate
approach.32 SUR is a system of linear equations with only exogenous regressors. The key
difference to OLS is that it assumes that the errors may be correlated across equations
and follow the same variance-covariance distribution. It is very likely that banks’ net
purchases of government bonds are partially driven by some unobserved factors, which
are highly correlated to the unobserved factors driving the same banks’ net purchases of
other bonds. SUR allows nonzero covariance between the error terms of the equations
with government bonds and other bonds as dependent variables.
While SUR seems a suitable approach for the purpose of this analysis, there are short-
comings, which need to be addressed. Firstly and similar to pooled OLS, SUR requires
all explanatory variables to be exogenous. While the assumption of exogeneity is likely
to hold for the macroeconomic controls, the bank-specific factors might be subject to en-
dogeneity. To address this issue, all bank-specific variables are instrumented with their
lags. Since it is implausible that an institution’s net purchases of government bonds in
period t affect its profitability and return on equity in t-1, the issue of endogeneity seems
sufficiently addressed.
30 We run several sensitivity tests with alternative windows and the results are qualitatively similar for
shorter windows (until around 4 days) while significance decreases or diminishes for longer windows.
31 An alternative option is to run the model 30 times, implying that there would be windows spanning, for
instance, from day 25 to 5 of the following month. However, since the capital and liquidity requirements
(as well as all other variables) represent monthly figures, one would have to calculate averages over
different months. Since we are interested in portfolio adjustments of banks with low capital and liquidity
levels, calculating averages would make the key results significantly less precise.
32 See the seminal contribution of Zellner (1962) and a literature overview by Fiebig (2001).
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A bank’s capital and liquidity positions are also instrumented by their lags, since the
purpose of this paper is to analyze whether a bank’s capital and liquidity ratios in month
m-1 affect its net purchases of government bonds in period m.
Another potential problem is that SUR assumes that there is no correlation of the error
term across individuals. However, in case of an unobserved macroeconomic shock there
would be correlation of the error terms. Although this does not make SUR a biased es-
timator, this issue is addressed by including time dummies that correct for these potential
correlations.
In addition, the conducted Hausman tests indicate that fixed effects would be preferred
over random effects as the independent variables and bank-specific effects are correlated.
These results motivate the inclusion of bank dummies in our regressions.
4. Results
4.1. Liquidity buffer
Figure 5 shows that banks’ regulatory liquidity position significantly affects their net pur-
chases of government bonds. The liquidity requirement seems to cause a substitution ef-
fect with banks close to their regulatory threshold buying more government bonds while
selling other bonds. Figure 5 also shows that the revision of the DLCR in May 2011,
making government bonds relatively more attractive, significantly increases the observed
effect.
[Insert Figure 5 here]
Figure 5 shows that banks’ liquidity position determines their demand for government
bonds as well as other bonds. More specifically, it can be seen that a higher DLCR in
the previous period causes banks to reduce their purchases of government bonds, while
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it increases their purchases of other types of bonds. This effect is in line with the previ-
ously described theory regarding the functioning of a liquidity ratio. Government bonds
fully count towards the liquidity requirement while other bonds receive high haircuts. As
such, when running the risk of becoming non-compliant with the requirement, banks are
incentivized to substitute other bonds with government bonds.
Figure 5a presents the regression coefficients of the DLCR on banks’ net purchases
of government bonds. It can be seen that banks’ regulatory liquidity position does not
seem to affect banks’ net purchases of government bonds in the first half of the following
month. However, from the 21st day until the end of the month (indicated by heavy width
in Figure 5a), a 1% (standard deviation) higher DLCR reduces banks’ net purchases of
government bonds between 0.04% (3.4%) and 0.06% (5.1%) of average purchases. On
top of that, a downward slope towards the end of the month can be observed. The revision
of the DLCR, leading to a general increase of haircuts but relatively less for government
bonds, significantly enhances the observed regulatory effect. After the revision in May
2011, a 1% (sd) higher DLCR leads to an additional reduction of banks’ net purchases of
government bonds between 0.09% (8.0%) and 0.15% (13.5%).
Figure 5b shows that a bank’s regulatory liquidity position in period m-1 does not
affect its net purchases of other bonds during the first half of month m. However, from
day 18 onwards banks with lower liquidity holdings seem to increase their sales of other
bonds, substituting them with government bonds. Specifically, a 1% (sd) higher DLCR
increases banks’ net purchases of other bonds between 0.04% (3.7%) and 0.06% (5.9%).
After the revision in May 2011, this effect increases further with 0.03% (2.5%) to 0.07%
(6.1%) per increase of the DLCR by 1% (sd). The economic effect of the regulatory
liquidity position on banks’ demand for other bonds is therefore very similar to Figure
5a.
If a bank’s regulatory liquidity position affects its net purchases of government bonds
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over the entire month, it cannot be established whether this effect comes from regulation
or from internal risk management targets. With the DLCR affecting banks’ net purchases
only from day 18 onwards, it can be concluded that there is limited evidence of an internal
effect incentivizing banks with lower liquidity holdings to purchase more government
bonds or sell more other bonds. The combined evidence of the DLCR affecting banks’
demand only towards the end of the month and the slopes presented in Figure 5 show clear
signs of a regulatory effect, suggesting that the DLCR incentivizes banks to substitute
government bonds for other bonds. This effect is additionally confirmed by the effects
caused by the revision of the DLCR in May 2011.
4.2. Capital buffer
Similar to liquidity, Figure 6 shows that the regulatory capital position is an important
determinant of banks’ net purchases of government bonds. One can see that a lower
regulatory capital ratio in the previous month causes banks to buy considerably more
government bonds and sell more other bonds.
[Insert Figure 6 here]
Figure 6a shows that a 1% (sd) higher capital ratio reduces banks’ demand for gov-
ernment bonds between 0.44% (2.2%) and 1.17% (5.9%). Although the effect is already
significant from day 11, there is a large increase immediately before reporting. This pat-
tern suggests that a lower capital position causes an internal effect, which is significantly
increased by a regulatory effect towards the end of the month. In terms of economic
significance, the effect of capital regulation is similar to the effect of liquidity regulation
before the revision in May 2011.
Capital regulation seems to cause a similar substitution effect to liquidity regulation.
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As can be seen in Figure 6b, a 1% (sd) higher regulatory capital ratio increases banks’
demand for other bonds between 0.55% (2.7%) and 0.97% (4.9%). Significant results
appear from day 15 but not prior to that (indicated by heavy width in Figure 6b).
4.3. Results for control variables
Table 2 shows our results for the control variables. It includes information on the period
in which the variables have a significant impact on banks’ net purchases of government
bonds, the range of the significant coefficients, as well as the standard deviation of the
variable (not the results).
Banks’ profitability (net income as a percentage of total assets) has a significant impact
on banks’ net purchases of government bonds in the first half of the month. An increase
by 1sd increases banks’ net purchases between 3.0% and 3.3%. The annual GDP growth
rate of the Netherlands reduces banks’ purchases between 1.1% and 1.2%. The variable
is significant until day 26 but not afterwards. Until day 18, the government debt of the
Netherlands increases banks’ purchases of government bonds between 4% and 10% per
increase by 1sd. The yield on Dutch government bonds is significant for almost the en-
tire month. A 1sd increase of the yield, reduces banks’ purchases of government bonds
between 0.2% and 0.5%. During the first half of the month, the relative rating of the
Netherlands reduces banks’ purchases between 5.8% and 7.6%. Finally, the growth rate
of banks’ required liquidity increases their purchases of government bonds between 1.3%
and 1.4%. The remaining variables do not have a significant impact on banks’ purchases
of government bonds.
[Insert Table 2 here]
In general terms, our results appear plausible. The intuition behind the positive effect of
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an increase in banks’ required liquidity on their net purchases of government bonds is
straightforward. Increased liquidity risks incentivize banks to purchase more government
bonds.
Similarly, it seems plausible that the purchases of Dutch government bonds increase
if they are of relatively better quality (relative rating), are relatively cheaper (yield) and
the supply is larger (Dutch government debt).33 The negative effect of GDP growth on
banks’ purchases is likely caused by the lack of profitable investment opportunities dur-
ing economic declines, leading banks to turn to government bonds. The result is also
consistent with the procyclicality of risk-based capital requirements. The insignificant
effect of the average reserve requirement is likely caused by the excess cash in the market
and by the fact that the requirement is never binding, as discussed in Section 2.4. The
insignificance of the other variables is likely caused by multicollinearity problems as, for
instance, in the case of banks’ return on equity, which might be captured by banks’ capital
and profitability.
5. Regulatory reaction and bank behavior
The previous section suggests that there is a regulatory effect that causes banks’ demand
for government bonds to increase beyond their internal risk management targets. While
this is a useful insight, it is important to understand the potential impact of this regulatory
effect on banks’ lending to the private sector.34
One can distinguish two ways in which government bond holdings affect credit sup-
ply.35 The first one is direct and explained by Gennaioli et al. (2014): A sovereign crisis
33 The results regarding yield could potentially be subject to reverse causality. It might be that lower
demand for government bonds causes their yields to increase.
34 See Gorton and Huang (2004) for a paper discussing the role of governments in liquidity provision.
35 Also see Popov and van Horen (2013).
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has a relatively larger negative impact on the asset value of institutions with high govern-
ment bond holdings.36 Losses on sovereign debt can reduce the bank’s profitability and
also raise concerns about counterparty risk, which in turn will have an adverse impact on
the availability and cost of funding. Secondly, Holmstroem and Tirole (1993) argue that
sovereign debt is usually a reliable source of liquidity and collateral. Increased sovereign
risk would therefore reduce the value of an important funding source.
For their analysis, Gennaioli et al. (2014) as well as Popov and van Horen (2013), use
an absolute measure of government bond holdings (e.g. government bond holdings as a
percentage of total assets) and argue that regulation is a key driver of higher government
bond holdings. For an analysis regarding the impact of government bond holdings on
banks’ lending to the real economy, it is important to distinguish banks’ general govern-
ment bond holdings and the regulatory reaction. Since they are all part of banks’ assets
and banks usually try to avoid excessive balance sheet expansions, there is a direct link
between banks’ bond holdings and their loan issuances. The result that high government
bond holdings reduce banks’ loan issuances might not be specific to government bonds. It
might be the case that banks, when obtaining more bonds, generally try to reduce lending
or vice versa. Similarly, since Popov and van Horen (2013) and Gennaioli et al. (2014)
specifically focus on sovereign debt crises, the negative impact of government bond hold-
ings on lending seems a logical consequence. Again, however, one might observe similar
effects when analyzing other types of bonds during other types of crises. In line with the
earlier analysis in this paper, we attempt to identify the impact of the regulatory effect on
banks’ lending as clearly as possible. Instead of using banks’ stock of government bonds
as a key explanatory variable, our regression function is defined as follows:
36 This reduction in the value of banks’ assets is likely to occur during crises and since it is equivalent to a
large counterparty default straightforward in case of a government default.
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Lendingi,m = β0 +β1Estimated ∆net purchasesi,m +β2Dummym +β3(Estimated ∆net purchases∗Dummy)i,m
+β4Bond holdingsi,m−1 +β5Demandi,m +β6Controlsi,m(−1)+ εi,m
(4)
where Lendingi,m refers to institution i’s lending to the private sector in month m as a
percentage of total assets. The key explanatory variable Estimated ∆net purchasesi,m
is based on the predicted value of the dependent variable in Equation 3. However, for
this part of the analysis banks’ monthly average net purchases are calculated. To re-
flect the shape and the underlying motivation of the regulatory reaction, discussed in
Sections 4.1 and 4.2, we do not calculate simple averages but day-weighted averages.
Estimated ∆net purchasesi,m are therefore defined as follows:










The motivation underlying this calculation is that a stronger regulatory effect implies
higher demand towards the end of the month. Since higher net purchases towards the
end of the month receive a relatively higher weight, it will lead to a stronger increase of
Estimated ∆net purchasesi,m. The variable Estimated ∆net purchasesi,m has a mean of
4.83 and a median of 5.74. The 25th percentile is 0.76 while the 75th percentile amounts
to 12.10.
Dummym refers to two relevant periods in our study: 1) a crisis period, and 2) the
period after the revision of the DLCR. Although the entire period from June 2009 to
December 2012 can be considered to be a sovereign crisis, we attempt to define an addi-
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tional bank liquidity crisis within our sample. A recent study by the European Systemic
Risk Board (ESRB) points to two recent periods of increased liquidity stress: 1) October
6th 2008 to February 2nd 2009, and 2) September 26th 2011 to February 8th 2012.37
Since our time series does not include the first period, we define the second period as a
combined banking and sovereign crisis. Dummym is therefore either 1 during the com-
bined crisis scenario (and 0 otherwise) or 1 after the revision of the DLCR in May 2011.
Estimated ∆net purchases∗dummyi,m is an interaction term.
To account for banks’ balance sheet restrictions, we also include banks’ Bond holdingsi,m−1,
defined as total bond holdings (sum of government bonds and other bonds) as a percent-
age of total assets. As is common in the literature, the model also includes Demandi,m
to capture the demand side of bank lending.38 Demandi,m is calculated as the exposure-
weighted average growth rate of the economic sectors that institution i is lending to in
month m.
Finally, Controlsi,m(−1) include institutions’ lagged net income as a percentage of total
assets, the GDP growth rate of the Netherlands as well as the EONIA interest rate. Motiv-
ated by Hausman tests, all regressions are performed with fixed effect panel estimations.
Table 3 shows that banks’ regulatory reaction is associated with lower lending volumes.
There is no particular effect during the combined stress scenario, while the revision neg-
atively affects bank lending.
[Insert Table 3 here]
37 See ESRB (2014). It can also be argued that the liquidity crisis ended after ECB president Mario Draghi’s
speech on July 26th 20014 in London. Defining the crisis period that way does not lead to significantly
different results.
38 See, for instance, Popov and van Horen (2013) as well as Brown et al. (2010), Fabbro and Hack (2011)
or Deans and Stewart (2012).
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An increase of Estimated ∆net purchases by 1sd reduces banks’ credit supply between
12.9% (Column 1) and 13.6% (Column 3).39 Apart from being statistically significant
at the 1% confidence interval, the variable is also economically significant. Since banks’
government bond purchases increase the asset side of their balance sheet and banks usu-
ally try to avoid excessive balance sheet expansion, it appears logical to reduce lending
when buying more government bonds. The fact that loans usually have relatively high
RW and no liquidity value is an additional incentive for banks to reduce lending when
reacting to regulation.
Crisis does not have a significant impact on lending. This effect is likely caused by the
relatively short time period of this combined scenario and the fact that the entire period
can be defined as a crisis. The Revision of the DLCR, on the other hand, reduces lend-
ing by 3.1% (1% confidence interval). The interaction term Estimated ∆net purchases∗
revision does not affect bank lending. The Revision caused government bonds to be relat-
ively more attractive and increased banks’ net purchases. It seems therefore plausible that
the Revision reduced lending. However, there does not seem to be a reason why higher net
purchases should have an additional effect after the Revision, justifying the insignificance
of the interaction term.
Other variables worth mentioning are Total bonds and Demand. An increase of Total bonds
by 1sd reduces banks’ lending by about 6%. This result is in line with our expectations.
Higher bond holdings reduce the leeway to grant large amounts of loans while bonds are
usually more profitable than most types of lending, at least during stress. A 1sd increase
of Demand increases bank lending by about 4%.
Although different, our results regarding lending are related to Gennaioli et al. (2014)
39 As a sensitivity test, we also used the growth rate of bank lending as dependent variable. The results are
qualitatively similar.
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and Popov and van Horen (2013). However, while these two studies focus on failed or
nearly failed governments, the banks in the present analysis only buy Dutch government
bonds. The results in this section raise the question whether it is desirable that regulation
incentivizes banks to buy more government bonds since it seems to be associated with
less lending.
6. Shortcomings
Although this is one of the first studies attempting to directly estimate the impact of cap-
ital and liquidity regulation on banks’ demand for government bonds and its subsequent
impact on bank lending, a few caveats are in order.
As the MiFID data only includes Dutch government bonds, the time series does not
include a rating downgrade. However, the Netherlands was put on "negative watch" a
few times during this paper’s sample period, allowing to at least partially control for the
impact of downgrades. Additionally, all regressions include the relative rating of the
Netherlands compared to its peers (Germany, France, Belgium, Finland and Austria),
which can be expected to additionally account for these dynamics.
As the analysis combines two datasets with different means of consolidation, there is
a risk of a measurement bias.40 To address this bias and although it implies dropping
parts of the dataset, the analysis excludes all entities that do not belong to a Dutch group.
Since there is more detailed information on the Dutch entities, it is possible to match the
different datasets minimizing a measurement bias.
The analysis in this paper aims at capturing the impact of preferential treatment on
banks’ demand for government bonds and, in a second step, its impact on bank lending.
40 The MiFID database is reported on a solo level while the bank-specific supervisory data refers to the
fully consolidated balance sheet.
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Although the paper includes a clear link to the real economy, it remains a partial analysis.
To draw firm policy conclusions one would need to more broadly account for the impact
of increased government spending on the economy as a whole.
7. Conclusion
Government bonds receive preferential treatment in financial regulation. The purpose of
this paper is to analyze whether this preferential treatment increases banks’ demand for
government bonds beyond their own risk appetite, leading banks to substitute other types
of bonds with government bonds. The final step of our analysis aims at capturing the
impact of this regulatory effect on banks’ lending to the real economy.
Our results suggest that preferential treatment in microprudential capital and liquidity
regulation increases banks’ demand for government bonds. On top of that, it seems to
cause a substitution effect, with banks buying more government bonds while selling more
other bonds. Further, we find suggestive evidence that this "regulatory reaction" reduces
banks’ lending.
The rationale behind favorable treatment in financial regulation is the view that gov-
ernment bonds are risk-free assets, making them a reliable source of liquidity and col-
lateral. The European sovereign debt crisis, however, has exposed the risk of vicious
circles between fragile governments and weak banks. While this paper does not answer
the question whether high government bond holdings are desirable (or under which cir-
cumstances), it shows that if there is a desire to avoid these vicious circles in the future,
removing the preferential treatment of government bonds in financial regulation appears
to be a good starting point.
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Appendix
MiFID data cleaning and construction
MiFID requires institutions to report transactions per entity as opposed to the full
consolidation of the balance sheet information. A first step of the data construction is
therefore to identify those entities that belong to the same group. This is done using the
publicly available SWIFT codes. To ensure as clear identification as possible, we only
retain those transactions in which both counterparts can be identified as banks and at
least one of the two consolidated counterparts is a Dutch bank. The sample rule deletes
43,297 transactions, amounting to 7.8% (5.4%) of total transactions (volume). The major-
ity of the deleted transactions are trades between entities of British banks. This approach
ensures that all considered transactions are executed by a bank subject to prudential reg-
ulation of DNB, which causes 17 banks to remain in the dataset.
The MiFID transaction reports also indicate whether a bank acted as "Principal" or
"Agent". Acting as "Agent" implies that the bank acts on behalf of clients and therefore
never takes ownership of the instrument, while a principal transaction refers to a bank
acting on its own behalf. Since they are not relevant for the fulfilment of regulatory re-
quirements, all agent transactions are dropped. We also clean the data following the same
procedure as Dick-Nielsen et al. (2012). Specifically, the analysis corrects for double
reporting, which occurs when both institutions are EU financial institutions, erroneous
reporting of counterpart codes and banks’ reporting of (reverse) repos which should not
be reported in MiFID.
The average reserve requirement
Most central banks - among which the European Central Bank (ECB) - require credit
institutions to hold a minimum amount of reserves with them. An institution’s reserve
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requirement is determined by multiplying the reserve base with the reserve ratio. The re-
serve base includes retail deposits and a selection of short-term liabilities, while the ECB’s
reserve ratio is currently set at 1%.41 Compliance with minimum reserve requirements
is determined on the basis of banks’ average daily balances on the central bank reserve
accounts over the reserve maintenance period. The main function of the minimum reserve
requirement is to stabilize money market rates.
41 The ECB reserve ratio was reduced from previously 2% to 1% on January 18th 2012.
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Comparison of liquidity standards DLCR and LCR
Comparison liquidity requirements
Haircuts on liquid assets DLCR LCR
Cash 0% 0%
Central bank reserves 0% 0%
Government bonds 5% (10%) 0%
Covered bonds 20% 15%
Corporate bonds 20% (50%) 15%-50%
Securitizations 20% (50%) 25%
Inflows rates
Retail loans 50% 50%
Interbank loans 100% 100%
Outflow rates
Retail deposits 10%-20% 3%-10%
Corporate deposits 50%-100% 40%-75%
Interbank deposits 100% 100%
Note: The table shows a comparison of the Dutch and the Basel III liquidity require-
ments. Numbers in brackets refer to haircuts after the DLCR’s revision in May 2011.
The description is highly simplified. For more information, please see BCBS (2013)
and DNB (2003) or De Haan and van den End (2013).
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Figure 1: Banks’ holdings of government bonds from 2004 to 2012
2.2. Government bond holdings from 2004 to 2013
Although the paper focuses on banks’ demand for government bonds, it is useful to first have a
look at how banks’ holdings of government bonds emerged in recent years. Figure 1 shows the
evolution of banks’ government bond holdings from 2004 to 2013. The vertical lines represent the
start (June 2009) and end date (December 2012) of the MiFID dataset.
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b: Holdings in liquid assets over time
Note: The figure shows banks’ average and median holdings of government bonds with 0% risk-weights
under the Basel 2 Standardized Approach as percentage of total assets (Figure 1a) and liquid assets as
defined by the DLCR (Figure 1b). The vertical lines represent the start (June 2009) and end date (December
2012) of the MiFID dataset.
The data is provided within the reporting of the DLCR and includes all government bonds with a
0% risk-weight under the Basel 2 Standardized Approach. On average, Dutch government bonds
comprise around 40% of banks’ total government bond holdings, closely followed by German
government bonds. Many Dutch banks also hold some Belgian, French and very small amounts
of Southern European bonds.
As can be seen from Figure 1a, in 2004 banks’ average holdings of high quality government
bonds amounted to about 12% while median holdings were just above 8%. Apart from some
smaller spikes, banks’ government bond holdings decline relatively steadily until the outbreak
of the financial crisis in September 2008. As typical during financial crises, government bonds
rise between September 2008 and September 2009 from just above 8% to almost 12.5%. In
October 2009, Greece announced that it significantly underreported its budget deficit. After this
announcement, which is frequently defined as the beginning of the European sovereign debt crisis,
banks seem to significantly reduce their government exposure. While average holdings stabilize
in the course of 2011, median holdings show another sharp reduction, suggesting that there are a
number of banks, which seem to have maintained larger amounts.
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2.2. Government bond holdings from 2004 to 2013
Although the paper focuses on banks’ demand for government bonds, it is useful to first have a
look at how banks’ holdings of government bonds emerged in recent years. Figure 1 shows the
evolution of banks’ government bond holdings from 2004 to 2013. The vertical lines represent the
start (June 2009) and end date (December 2012) of the MiFID dataset.
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The data is provided ithin the reporting of the L and includes all government bonds with a
0% risk- eight under the Basel 2 Standardized pproach. n average, Dutch government bonds
comprise around 40 of banks’ total government bond holdings, closely followed by German
government bonds. Many Dutch banks also hold some Belgian, French and very small amounts
of Southern European bonds.
As can be seen from Figure 1a, in 2004 banks’ average holdings of high quality government
bonds amounted to about 12% while median holdings were just above 8%. Apart from some
smaller spikes, banks’ government bond holdings decline relatively steadily until the outbreak
of the financial crisis in September 2008. As typical during financial crises, government bonds
rise between September 2008 and September 2009 from just above 8% to almost 12.5%. In
October 2009, Greece announced that it significantly underreported its budget deficit. After this
announcement, which is frequently defined as the beginning of the European sovereign debt crisis,
banks seem to significantly reduce their government exposure. While average holdings stabilize
in the course of 2011, median holdings show another sharp reduction, suggesting that there are a
number of banks, which seem to have maintained larger amounts.
6
b: oldings in liquid assets over time
Note: The figure shows banks’ average and median holdings of government bonds with 0% risk
weights under the Basel II Standardized Approach as a percentage of total assets (Figure 1a) and
liquid assets as defined by the DLCR (Figure 1b). The vertical lines represent the start (June 2009)
and end date (December 2012) of the MiFID dataset.
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Figure 2: Capital and liquidity, 2004-2012
haircuts of government bonds to 10% while the haircuts of most other bonds increased to 50%.12
Apart from covered bonds, which receive a haircut of 20%, all bonds issued by corporates or
banks receive a haircut of 50%. The revision in May 2011 made governments therefore relatively
more attractive from a regulatory point of view. This difference between the LCR and the DLCR
implies that the potential impact is even bigger for the LCR.
Similar to capital, an institution can steer its DLCR by either increasing its AL or by reducing
its RL.13 Again, however, reducing liabilities seems to be a less feasible option than increasing li-
quid assets. Buying government bonds appears to be the most efficient strategy to correct a DLCR
deficiency.
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Note: The figure shows the components of the aggregate liquidity and capital requirements from 2004 to
2012. The solid vertical lines show the start and end date of the MiFID dataset used for the regression
analysis. The dashed line in Figure 2a shows the revision of the liquidity rule in May 2011.
Figure 2 shows the evolution of the components of both the DLCR and the capital requirement.
Figure 2a shows that banks’ available and required liquidity are quite closely correlated. Accord-
ing to recent evidence by Banerjee and Hio (2014), banks mainly adjust their asset side in response
to liquidity regulation. Banks’ liquidity buffers steadily increase from 2004 until the beginning
of the financial crisis in 2008, when buffers begin to decline. A particularly sharp decline can
be observed right after the failure of Lehman Brothers in October 2008. The period of the Mi-
FID dataset (June 2009 to December 2012) is relatively calm. An exception is the revision of the
liquidity rule in May 2011, when available liquidity sharply declines.
12 For more details, see http://www.toezicht.dnb.nl/en/2/51-201890.jsp and http://www.toezicht.dnb.nl/en/2/51-
201842.jsp.
13 Note that for the purpose of this analysis, we calculate a DLCR ratio reflected by AL in percentage of RL.
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to liquidity regulation. Banks’ liquidity bu fers steadily increase from 2 04 until the begi ning
of the financial crisis in 2 08, when bu fers begin to decline. A particularly sharp decline can
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liquidity rule in May 20 1, when available liquidity sharply declines.
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Note: The figure shows the components of the aggregate liquidity and capital requirements from
2004 to 2012. The solid vertical lines mark the start and end date of the MiFID dataset used for
the regression analysis. The dashed line in Figure 2a marks the revision of the liquidity rule in
May 2011.
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b: Capital (%) per bank
Note: The figure shows the distribution of the DLCR and capital requirement per bank over the
period from June 2009 to December 2012.
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Figure 4: Banks’ net purchases of Dutch government bonds and other bonds
every day active as buyer or seller. Day 12, for instance, refers to banks’ average net demand
between day 3 and day 12.
Figure 5a shows that banks’ net demand for government bonds is fairly stable throughout a
month and only shows a slight downward slope towards the end of the month. The average over
the entire month is 22.74% with 19.65% and 24.08% being the minimum and maximum, respect-
ively. A similar pattern can be observed for the number of observations. An important takeaway
from Figure 5a is that on aggregate banks do not seem to increase but rather decrease their demand
for government bonds towards the reporting date.
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Net demand # Observations
b: Other bonds
Note: Figure 5 shows banks’ average net demand for government bonds (Figure 5a) and other bonds (Figure
5b) over buckets consisting of 10 days as well as the corresponding number of observations. Banks’ net
demand is calculated as the average of the difference between institutions’ gross demand and gross supply
of bond b (government bond or other bonds) in percentage of their average daily gross demand during the
year. The number of observations corresponds with the total number of trades executed by banks that are
at least once every day active as buyer or seller. Day 12, for instance, refers to banks’ average net demand
between day 3 and day 12.
Figure 5b shows that, similar to government bonds, banks’ demand for other bonds is stable during
the course of the month. The average over the entire sample is 8.08% with the maximum and
minimum being 6.36% and 9.70%, respectively. In contrast to government bonds, banks’ demand
for other bonds somewhat increases towards the end of the month. The data does not suggest
the presence of a general regulatory effect with all banks buying more government bonds while
selling more other bonds right before reporting.
2.6. Summary statistics
As stated earlier, the analysis in this paper includes 17 Dutch banks. The constructed variables
based on the MiFID transaction reports and the fulfilment of the reserve requirement reflect daily
observations per bank. All other bank-specific variables are reported monthly while the macroe-
conomic variables (apart from EONIA and the relative rating of the Netherlands) are reflected by
13
a: Govern ent bonds
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b: Other bonds
Note: Figure 5 shows banks’ average net demand for government bonds (Figure 5a) and other bonds (Figure
5b) over buckets consisting of 10 days as we l as the co responding number of observations. Banks’ net
demand is calculated as the average of the di ference betw en institutions’ gro s demand and gro s su ply
of bond b (government bond or other bonds) in percentage of their average daily gro s demand during the
year. The number of observations co responds with the total number of trades executed by banks that are
at least once every day active as buyer or se ler. Day 12, for instance, refers to banks’ average net demand
betw en day 3 and day 12.
Figure 5b shows that, similar to government bonds, banks’ demand for other bonds is stable during
the course of the month. The average over the entire sample is 8.08% with the maximum and
minimum being 6.36% and 9.70%, respectively. In contrast to government bonds, banks’ demand
for other bonds somewhat increases towards the end of the month. The data does not su gest
the presence of a general regulatory e fect with a l banks buying more government bonds while
se ling more other bonds right before reporting.
2.6. Summary statistics
As stated earlier, the analysis in this paper includes 17 Dutch banks. The constructed variables
based on the MiFID transaction reports and the fulfilment of the reserve requirement reflect daily
observations per bank. A l other bank-specific variables are reported monthly while the macroe-
conomic variables (apart from EONIA and the relative rating of the Netherlands) are reflected by
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b: Other bonds
Note: The figure shows banks’ net purchases of Dutch government bonds (Figure 5a) and other
bonds (Figure 5b) over windows consisting of 10 days, as well as the corresponding number of
bservations. Banks’ net purchas s are calculat d s the av r g of the differenc between i stitu-
tions’ gross purchases and gross sal f bond b (gover ment b nd or oth r bonds) in percent ge
of their av rag dail gross purchases during the year. The numb r f observ tions corr spo s
with the total number of trades executed by banks that are active as a buyer or a seller at least once
every day. Day 12, for instance, refers to banks’ average net purchases between day 3 and day 12.
42
Table 1: Summary statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Dependent variables
Net purchases of government bonds 3,520 22 25 -61 123
Net purchases of other bonds 2,890 8 42 -98 152
Key explanatory variables
Liquidity buffer 527 151 91 -26 416
Capital buffer 527 10 5 -0.09 32
Control variables
Average reserve requirement 3,520 115 42 35 399
Net income as a % total assets 527 1.23 0.74 -1 5
Net income as a % total capital 527 1.92 4 -18 17
Total assets (ln) 527 22 25 -61 123
Private sector lending as a % total assets 527 39 13 12 62
Total bond holdings as a % total assets 527 10 9 2 48
Demand 527 -0.19 1.64 -3 3
EONIA 11 0.49 0.28 0.07 1
Quarterly GDP growth rate (%) of the Netherlands 11 0.06 0.37 -1.42 0.99
Quarterly government debt as a % GDP 11 55 2 49 57
Quarterly NL rating over average peers’ rating 11 0.77 0.06 0.68 0.83
Quarterly yield on Dutch government bonds 11 0.02 0.008 -0.96 0.16
Note: The table shows summary statistics for all relevant variables. The number of observations refers to unique observations.
This means, for instance, that the macroeconomic variables only show one observation per month for the period from June
2009 to December 2012.
43













































10 15 20 25 30
b: Other bonds
Note: The figure presents the results obtained using SUR before (solid line) and after (dashed)
the revision of the DLCR in May 2011 (reflected by the sum of the coefficients before and after
the revision). The analysis aims at explaining the impact of banks’ regulatory liquidity position
on their demand for government bonds and other bonds. The dependent variable reflects the
difference between institution i’s gross purchases and gross sales of bond b (government bond
or other bonds) on day d as a percentage of its average daily gross purchases of bond b during
the year. Apart from the presented coefficients for the DLCR (distance of an institution’s DLCR
to the 100% regulatory threshold), all regressions include Capital, as well as a large number of
additional control variables. The regressions are looped over windows consisting of 10 days over
the course of the month, plotted on the x-axis in the figure. For instance, on day 13 one can see the
coefficient of regressing the DLCR in month m-1 on banks’ daily net purchases during day 4 to
13 of month m. Heavy width represents statistically significant values, while normal width points
to insignificance. The differences of the DLCR’s statistical significance at the beginning and the
end of the month are statistically significant at the 95% confidence level (F-test).
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b: Other bonds
Note: The figure presents results obtained using SUR. The analysis aims at explaining the impact
of banks’ regulatory capital position on their net purchases of government bonds and other bonds.
The dependent variable reflects the difference between institution i’s gross purchases and gross
sales of bond b (government bond or other bonds) on day d as a percentage of its average daily
gross purchases of bond b during the year. Apart from the presented coefficients for Capital
(distance of an institution’s regulatory capital holdings to the 8% threshold), all regressions include
the DLCR, as well as a large number of additional control variables. The regressions are looped
over windows consisting of 10 days over the course of the month, plotted on the x-axis. On day 10
one can see the coefficient of regressing Capital in month m-1 on banks’ daily net purchases from
day 1 to 10 of month m. Heavy width represents statistically significant values while normal width
points to insignificance. The differences of the DLCR’s statistical significance at the beginning
and the end of the month are statistically significant at the 95% confidence level (F-test).
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Table 2: Results control variables
Variable Significant days government bonds Coefficients government bonds Std.Dev.
Liquidity buffer 21-30 -0.06 to -0.04 91
Liquidity buffer*revision 20-30 -0.15 to -0.09 81
Capital buffer 11-30 -1.17 to -0.44 5
Net income as a % total assets 1-14 4.0 to 4.3 0.74
GDP growth rate NL 1-26 -3.0 to -3.3 0.37
Government debt as a % GDP 1-18 2 to 5 2
Yield on Dutch government bonds 11-30 -68 to -30 0.008
NL rating over average peers’ rating 1-18 -127 to -97 0.06
Growth rate of Required Liquidity 15-18 -0.08 to -0.09 16
Average reserve requirement - - 42
Private sector lending as a % total assets - - 39
Net income as a % total capital - - 4
EONIA - - 0.49
Note: The table shows the summary of the results for our control variables. It includes information on the period in which the variables
significantly impact banks’ purchases of government bonds, the range of the significant coefficients, as well as the standard deviation of the
variable (not the result). A dash indicates that the variable has no significant coefficients.
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Table 3: Government bonds and lending
1 2 3
Estimated ∆net purchases -0.300*** -0.310*** -0.316***
(0.085) (0.086) (0.094)








Total bonds (lagged) 0.631*** 0.603*** 0.511***
(0.151) (0.164) (0.184)
Return on equity (lagged) -0.131 -0.151 -0.146
(0.125) (0.132) (0.131)
Demand 2.138** 2.603** 2.494***
(0.822) (1.041) (1.088)
GDP NL -0.715 -1.057 -0.814
(1.059) (1.177) (1.011)
EONIA -7.051* -7.948** -6.941**
(3.448) (3.725) (3.832)
Constant 47.562*** 48.796*** 44.654***
(2.995) (3.501) (3.981)
Observations 234 234 234
R2 0.835 0.839 0.775
Note: The table presents results of regressions estimated with fixed effect panel estim-
ations including lagged variables and robust standard errors. The dependent variable
is banks’ lending to the private sector. Estimated ∆net purchases is the day-weighted
average net portfolio adjustment for government bonds. Crisis is a dummy, which
is 1 for the period from September 2011 to February 2012 and 0 otherwise, while
Revision is a dummy describing the period after the revision of the DLCR in May
2011. Total bonds is defined as banks’ total bond holdings (sum of government
bonds and other bonds) as a percentage of total assets, while Return on Equity de-
scribes banks’ net income as a % of total capital. Demand is calculated as the expos-
ure weighted average growth rate of the economic sectors an institution is lending to.
Finally GDP NL refers to the quarterly growth rate of the Netherlands, while EONIA
describes the EONIA interest rate. Statistical significance is indicated by *** p<0.01,
** p<0.05, * p<0.1 while standard errors are in parentheses.
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